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CASE NOTES
CIVIL PROCEDURE-Jurisdiction-Mere Agreement to
Make Payments in Texas Fails to Establish Minimum
Contact Sufficient To Satisfy Due Process
Requirements for Long-Arm Jurisdiction

U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt,
553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W.
3307 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1977) (No. 77-614).
U-Anchor, a Texas corporation, contracted to supply N.H. Burt, a resident of Oklahoma, advertising displays at various Oklahoma locations.
Under the contract, which was solicited and executed in Oklahoma, Burt
was to make monthly payments at U-Anchor's office in Texas, and UAnchor was to construct display signs and erect them in Oklahoma. Burt
mailed several payments to U-Anchor's office in Texas, but then ceased
further payments. Thereafter, U-Anchor filed suit for breach of contract.
Pursuant to the Texas long-arm statute, citation was served upon the
Texas Secretary of State as agent for service of process. Burt entered a
special appearance to contest the court's jurisdiction; the trial court sustained his motion and dismissed the suit. The court of civil appeals affirmed, and held that although Burt unquestionably was doing business in
Texas under the long-arm statute, his contacts with Texas fell short of the
requirements of due process.' Held-Affirmed. Although the contract was
one which was partially performable in Texas and thus was within the
Texas long-arm statute, a mere agreement to make payment in Texas
under a contract solicited and consummated outside the state fails to
establish minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy due process.'
Long-arm jurisdiction is the power of a court to render valid judgments
against defendants not present within the court's territorial boundaries.3
Such jurisdiction must be invoked whenever a nonresident defendant is to
be made amenable to suit in a jurisdiction in which he has not been
personally served with process, made a general appearance, or consented
to suit.,
1. U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 544 S.W.2d 500, 504 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1976), afl'd, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3307 (U.S. Nov.
8, 1977) (No. 77-614).
2. U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Tex. 1977), petition for cert.
filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3307 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1977) (No. 77-614).
3. R.LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw § 22 (1968).
4. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 93 (1971). See generally von
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Over the past half-century a fundamental change in the concept of state
court jurisdiction has resulted in consistent liberalization of long-arm jurisdiction.5 The United States Supreme Court set the stage for this transformation in Pennoyer v. Neff, where it washeld that, unless a nonresident was personally served within a court's territorial jurisdiction, the
court could not acquire in personam jurisdiction over him.7 This conclusion
flowed naturally from the basic premises of the "power in fact" concept of
state jurisdiction.' Under this concept a state possessed exclusive jurisdiction over persons and property within its territory and, conversely, it possessed no jurisdictional authority outside that territory.' Any judgment
rendered without such de facto power, or personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, violated due process and was a nullity."
The Pennoyer territorial power concept fit well within the national
scheme of several autonomous states comprising one federation, but its
rule soon proved to be overly restrictive." As technological progress in the
fields of transportation and communications increased, there came a corresponding increase in interstate travel and corporate activities. Yielding to
this modern reality, later cases recognized that common notions of justice
required some defendants to face suits in foreign states.'2 The initial modification of the Pennoyer principle was by means of legal fictions such as
Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV.
1121, 1137 (1966); Wilson, In Personam JurisdictionOver Nonresidents: An Invitation and a

Proposal, 9 BAYLOR L.

REV.

363, 375-77 (1957).

5. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957). See generally Hazard,
A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241, 272-88; Kurland, The
Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State
Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 569, 586 (1958); Thode, In
Personam Jurisdiction; Article 2031B, the Texas "Long Arm" JurisdictionStatute; and the
Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TExAs L. REV. 279, 297302 (1964).
6. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
7. Id. at 720.
8. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
9. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
10. Id. at 722-23; see Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U.S. 185, 188 (1886).
11. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) the Court stated, "technological
progress has increased the flow of commerce between States. . . . In response to these
changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the
rigid rule of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, to the flexible standard of InternationalShoe Co.
v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310." The opinion in Pennoyer provided several exceptions to its
announced rule concerning divorce jurisdiction and substituted service on corporations and
business associations. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-36 (1877). These exceptions have
been characterized as inconsistencies and highly criticized for their impact on subsequent
state laws. See Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REV.
241, 271-81.
12. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (resident injured in forum by
nonresident motorist); Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917) (foreign
corporation doing business in state); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579,
583 (1914) (foreign corporation doing business in state). See generally Developments in the
Law-State Court Jurisdiction,73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 916-18 (1960). -
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"implied consent' '1 3 and "corporate presence."'" The Supreme Court, in
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,'5 however, expressly rejected these
fictions,'" and set forth the "minimum contacts" test of jurisdiction."
Under InternationalShoe it was not the territorial power of the court, but
rather the relations between the court, the controversy, and the parties
that gave rise to the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction.' 8 Thus, if the nonresident defendant had certain "minimum contacts" within the forum state,
then "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" would not
be violated by making him amenable to suit in the forum."
After InternationalShoe several states rewrote or enacted long-arm statutes in response to this newly expanded potential jurisdiction.' In 1959 the
Texas Legislature adopted its first general long-arm statute, allowing
courts to obtain jurisdiction over nonresidents who engage in business
2
within the state. '
Generally, Texas courts must answer two threshold questions when
asked to invoke long-arm jurisdiction: first, whether the Texas statute
13. See Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 340 (1953) (analysis of nonresident
motorist's implied consent to service of process upon state official); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S.
352, 356-57 (1927) (by using state's highways nonresident motorist consented to service of
process upon state official).
14. See Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917) (corporation could
be deemed "present" for service of process in state where it did business); International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 583 (1914) (corporation could be deemed "present"
for service of process in state where it did business).
15. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
16. Id. at 316-18.
17. Id. at 316.
18. Id. at 320 (continuous solicitation by defendant's salesmen in state deemed sufficient); see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 (1958) (affiliating circumstances without
which courts of a state may not enter judgment); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355
U.S. 220, 222 (1957) (insurance contract with resident deemed sufficient).
19. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
20. See Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction;Article 2031B, the Texas "Long Arm" Jurisdiction Statute; and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdictionin Texas and Elsewhere, 42
TEXAS L. REV. 279, 304 (1964). For examples of long-arm statutes see: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27340 (1962); FLA. STAT. § 48.181 (1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968); MD.
CTS. & Jun. PRoc. CODE ANN. § 6-103 (1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 303.13(1)(3) (West 1969);
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 851-58 (1973
& Supp. 1977).
21. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 3 (Vernon 1964). By entering into a
contract with a Texas resident which is performed by either party in whole or in part in Texas,
a nonresident natural person or corporation is considered to be doing business in Texas. Id.
§ 4. Prior to 1959, Texas had several particularized long-arm statutes. See, e.g., 1929 Tex.
Gen. Laws, ch. 125 at 279, presently codified in TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2039a (Vernon
1964) (nonresident motorist statute); 1933 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 202 at 606, presently codified
in TEx. REv. Cwv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031a (Vernon 1964) (in personam jurisdiction over nonresident by serving agent); 1935 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 463, § 1, at 1759, presently codified in TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2033b (Vernon 1964) (foreign corporation must appoint agent for
service of process to do business in state).
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provides for the exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident under the facts
of the case, and second, whether such exercise of jurisdiction would violate
due process." The fact that a given defendant is amenable to suit under
the long-arm statute is not conclusive of due process." On the contrary,
the Texas statute has been interpreted as an effort by the state to reach
as far as federal constitutional requirements will allow. As a result, it is
due process considerations, rather than statutory construction, that play
the decisive part in determining the extent of Texas long-arm jurisdiction. 2'
Although no mechanical standards can be applied to a due process test
which is based essentially on fairness,2" the Texas courts have adopted a
basic guideline." The nonresident's contact with the forum must be purposeful" and the cause of action must have some connection with the
contact.2 The equities of the situation are then considered to determine
22. See, e.g., Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 288 F.2d 69, 72 (5th
Cir. 1961); Cohn-Daniel Corp. v. Corporacion de Ia Fonda, Inc., 514 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, no writ); Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Lumar, 513 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
23. Gubitosi v. Buddy Schoellkopf Prods., Inc., 545 S.W.2d 528, 535 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1976, no writ). This is a logical conclusion from the proposition .thatdue process
must be satisfied in the application of long-arm statutes. See Product Promotions, Inc. v.
Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 491 (5th Cir. 1974); Zeisler v. Zeisler, 553 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1977, writ dism'd).
24. See, e.g., Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 491 (5th Cir. 1974);
Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1234 (5th Cir. 1973); Hoppenfeld v. Crook,
498 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
25. Hoppenfeld v. Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); see Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 492 (5th Cir. 1974). This result
has been cited as a desirable one in that it allows courts to concentrate on the constitutional
boundaries of due process rather than engage in defining "doing business" under the statute
and then turning to the constitutional issue. See Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction;Article
2031B, the Texas "Long Arm" JurisdictionStatute; and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEXAs L. REv. 279, 307 (1964).
26. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (due process requires
that maintenance of suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice). See generally Cardozo, The Reach of the Legislatureand the Grasp of Jurisdiction,
43 CORNELL L.Q. 210, 215 (1957); Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi In Rem Jurisdictionand
the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MICH. L. Rav. 300, 311-18 (1970).
27. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966); Hoppenfeld v.
Crook, 498 S.W.2d 52, 56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Sun-X Int'l Co. v.
Witt, 413 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
28. This requirement originated in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958), where
the court stated that the nonresident' must purposely avail himself of the "privilege" of
contact within the forum thereby invoking the benefits and protection of its laws. See O'Brien
v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966); Sun-X Int'l Co. v. Witt, 413 S.W.2d 761,
765 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967, writ refd n.r.e.).
29. O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966). This second requirement is
derived from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). The requirement has been relaxed, however, when the defendant has substantial yet unrelated activity
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whether traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice prohibit the
exercise of jurisdiction. 3° Further consideration may be given also to the
reasonable expectations of the parties, 31 the special interest of the forum
in litigating the controversy,3 2 and whether the defendant's contacts with
33
the forum were calculated to extract profits therefrom.
In U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt34 the Texas Supreme Court considered the jurisdictional guidelines and concluded that subjecting Burt to
suit in Texas would violate due process. 31 Although it was noted that Burt
entered into a contract with a Texas resident, and that the cause of action
arose from that contract, the court ruled that he did not purposely avail
himself of the privilege of doing business in Texas.36 Instead, U-Anchor
initiated Burt's sole and fortuitous contact with Texas. 7 Thus, the quality,
nature, and extent of Burt's contacts with Texas were less than minimal."'
Almost invariably a party desires to litigate in his home state, but since
the contract was solicited and executed in Oklahoma the court noted that
the parties reasonably must have expected that Oklahoma's laws would
govern its enforcement.3
Particular emphasis was placed" upon the United States Supreme
Court's ruling in Hanson v. Denckla" that the plaintiff resident's unilatwithin the forum. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446-47 (1952);
Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1234 (5th Cir. 1973); Eyerly Aircraft Co.
v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 1969).
30. Among the equitable considerations are the quality, nature, and extent of the defendant's activity in the forum, the relative convenience of the parties, and the benefits and
protections of the laws of the forum afforded the respective parties. O'Brien v. Lanpar Co.,
399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966); see National Truckers Serv., Inc. v. Aero Sys., Inc., 480
S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ refd n.r.e.); Sun-X Int'l Co. v. Witt,
413 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967, writ refd n.r.e.); Tyee Const. Co. v.
Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 381 P.2d 245, 247 (Wash. 1963).
31. Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1234 (5th Cir. 1973) (reasonable
to expect libelous material moving in interstate commerce would cause injury in Texas and
result in suit there); Parrish v. Schrimscher, 516 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1974, no writ) (nonresident initiated contact with forum and should have foreseen possibility
of suit therein).
32. In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) the court held the
nonresident defendant insurance company amenable to suit in the insured's home forum
since the state had a "manifest interest" in providing redress for its residents when their
insurers refused to pay their claims.
33. Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co. v. Consolidated Carpet Corp., 457 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1970, writ refd n.r.e.).
34. 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3307 (U.S. Nov. 8,
1977) (No. 77-614).
35. Id. at 763.
36. Id. at 763.
37. Id. at 763. The court felt that Burt had engaged in no activity in Texas. Id. at 763.
38. Id. at 763.
39. Id. at 763.
40. Id. at 763.
41. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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eral activity cannot satisfy the minimum contacts requirement.42 In the
present case it was clear that Burt's contacts with Texas did not result
from his own initiative but, rather, from U-Anchor's solicitations in Oklahoma. Thus, Burt's contacts were fortuitous and not purposeful.
The "purposeful act" requirement seeks to avoid the surprise which
results when the defendant's contacts within the forum are based solely on
the activity of the plaintiff." In Standard Leasing Co. v. Performance
Systems, Inc." a federal district court held that this requirement was
satisfied when the nonresident defendant knowingly entered into a contract with a Texas resident, and expressly agreed to make payments in
Texas. 5 Under comparable facts the Texas Supreme Court, in U-Anchor,
held that such contact is not "purposeful." This contradiction is a strong
predicate for a conclusion that Texas has adopted a strict definition of
"purposeful act." Technical attempts at defining "purposeful," however,
ignore the substance of the "purposeful act" test." More appropriately, the
test is whether the nonresident has engaged in some act or conduct by
which he may be said to have invoked the benefits and protections of the
laws of the forum. 7 Where a nonresident is active in bringing about contact
with the forum, it is reasonable to say that he sould have expected to face
suit there. Thus, where a nonresident initiates a contract in the forum
state, and although his only other contact might be payment by mail into
the forum, it has been held reasonable to assume that Texas law might be
invoked in the enforcement of the contract." Similarly, a corporation that
42. Id. at 253. The plaintiff in Hanson set up a trust in Delaware naming the defendant,
a Delaware corporation, as trustee. Subsequently, the plaintiff moved to Florida and filed suit
upon the trust there. The court held that the plaintiff's unilateral activity in moving to
Florida did not make the defendant amenable to suit there. Id. at 252.
43. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van
Dusen Air., Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 228 (6th Cir. 1972) (purposeful act test designed to insure
defendant's contact with forum was free and intentional); Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
426 F.2d 1315, 1318 (5th Cir. 1970) (corporation doing interstate business should find no
surprise in being subject to laws of various states); Clark Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Tice,
331 F. Supp. 1058, 1060 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 490 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1974).
44. 321 F. Supp. 977 (N.D. Tex. 1971).
45. Id. at 979.
46. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (corporation enjoys benefits and is subject to obligations of
forum's laws by doing business there). A purposeful act done by the defendant was required
in Hanson so that the inference could be drawn that he invoked the benefits and protection
of the laws of the forum. Once the defendant had invoked the benefits of the forum's laws,
he reasonably should have expected to be subject to them. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958).
47. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); Product Promotions, Inc. v.
Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 496 (5th Cir. 1974); Jetco Elec. Indus., Inc. v. Gardiner, 473 F.2d
1228, 1234 (5th Cir. 1973).
48. N.K. Parrish, Inc. v. Schrimscher, 516 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1974, no writ) (foreseeable that defendant's obligation to perform in Texas might be tested
there since he initiated the contact); see O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d 340, 343 (Tex.
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engages in various interstate activities may be subjected to the laws of
several states."
Some cases have held that by entering into a contract with a Texas
resident which is performable by either party in this state, a nonresident
has invoked the benefits and protections of the laws of Texas. 0 In Clark
Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Tice5 the district court justified such a finding
by pointing out that if the nonresident had found it necessary to bring suit
on the contract he would have had the full benefits and protections of the
state's laws in a suit in Texas courts.2 Other cases have held that an
express agreement to make payment in Texas is a purposeful act sufficient
to invoke the benefits and burdens of the state's laws." But the courts in
these cases have failed to.sufficiently justify their assumption of jurisdiction on fundamental fairness and public policy grounds." Instead they
have merely ruled that once the defendant purposely has contact within
the forum and a cause of action arises in connection with that contact,
there is nothing unfair about forcing the nonresident to defend in Texas. 5
1966). In O'Brien the court enforced an Illinois judgment against a Texas corporation. Jurisdiction in Illinois was based on the fact that the defendant's president went to Illinois to
arrange a contract with an Illinois attorney. Id. at 343.
49. See, e.g., Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315, 1318 (5th Cir. 1970); Clark
Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Tice, 331 F. Supp. 1058, 1060 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 490 F.2d
834 (5th Cir. 1974); Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645, 649 (N.D. Ill.
1965).
50. See Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 497 (5th Cir. 1974); Clark
Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Tice, 331 F. Supp. 1058, 1059-60 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 490 F.2d
834 (5th Cir. 1974); Standard Leasing Co. v. Performance Sys., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 977, 979
(N.D. Tex. 1971); Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co. v. Consolidated Carpet Corp., 457 S.W.2d 649,
651-52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
51. 331 F. Supp. 1058 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 490 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1974).
52. Id. at 1060.
53. See Standard Leasing Co. v. Performance Sys., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 977,979 (N.D. Tex.
1971) (nonresident defendant who agreed to make payments on loan guarantee assigned to
Texas resident held amenable to suit in Texas); Custom Leasing, Inc. v. Gardner, 307 F.
Supp. 161, 164 (N.D. Miss. 1969); National Truckers Serv., Inc. v. Aero Sys., Inc., 480 S.W.2d
455, 459 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ refd n.r.e.); cf. Product Promotions, Inc. v.
Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483, 497 (5th Cir. 1974) (agreement to submit test results in Texas
sufficient to make nonresident amendable to suit there).
54. Compare National Truckers Serv., Inc. v. Aero Sys., Inc., 480 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ refd n.r.e.) (not unfair to subject nonresident to suit in
forum on a certain contact once that contact is found to be purposeful) with Uppgren v.
Executive Aviation Servs., Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165, 171 (D. Minn. 1969) (due process issue can
be settled only by ascertaining what is fair and reasonable under the circumstances).
55. National Truckers Serv., Inc. v. Aero Sys., Inc., 480 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ refd n.r.e.); see Standard Leasing Co. v. Performance Sys., Inc.,
321 F. Supp. 977, 979 (N.D. Tex. 1971). But see In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air,
Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 1972). The In-Flight court noted that even though the
nonresident's contact with the forum is found to be "purposeful," the court must nevertheless
inquire into the fundamental fairness of making him defend there. Thus, the nonresident who
contracts to make payments in the forum may be said to have purposely done so, but it still
may be violative of due process to hold him amenable to suit there. Id. at 227 n.13.
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On facts similar to those in U-Anchor, a federal district court in
McQuay, Inc. v. Samuel Schlosberg, Inc.5" reached the same conclusion as
did the Texas Supreme Court. 7 The federal court held that the purpose of
the long-arm statute was to protect the state's citizens from foreign
"aggressors" rather than to support their activities outside the forum. 8
When a nonresident enters a state either personally to create business
obligations there, or by selling his products there in order to profit from
its markets, he invokes the protection of the forum's laws. 51 Conversely, a
passive nonresident purchaser expects no benefit or protection from the
forum's laws.8 0 Courts have frequently distinguished between buyer and
seller in applying long-arm statutes on the theory that the nonresident
buyer is less likely to have initiated the contact with the forum."'
Although a state may have an interest in providing a forum for its citizens' grievances, certain policy reasons exist for refusing jurisdiction when
the contacts are less than minimal. The extra-territorial power of individual states still has its limitations despite liberalized long-arm jurisdiction,
and courts must exercise such jurisdiction cautiously in order not to infringe on the power of a sister state."2 Enforcement of a judgment often
involves a suit upon that judgment in the nonresident's home forum. A
court must therefore satisfy its own jurisdictional requirements to insure
that its judgment will be honored in the foreign state under the full faith
and credit clause. 3 Another reason to deny jurisdiction upon such minimal
56. 321 F. Supp. 902 (D. Minn. 1971).
57. See id. at 907.

58. Id. at 906.
59. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945); Ziegler v. Houghton-Mifflin Co., 224 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1967).
60. Fourth Northwestern Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 117 N.W.2d 732, 736 (Minn.
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